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ABSTRACT
Security assurance in a computer system can be viewed as distinguishing between self and non-
self. Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are a class of machine learning (ML) techniques inspired
by the behavior of innate biological immune systems, which have evolved to accurately classify
self-behavior from non-self-behavior. This work aims to leverage AIS-based ML techniques for
identifying certain behavioral traits in high level hardware descriptions, including unsafe or un-
desirable behaviors, whether such behavior exists due to human error during development or due
to intentional, malicious circuit modifications, known as hardware Trojans, without the need for
a golden reference model. We explore the use of Negative Selection and Clonal Selection Algo-
rithms, which have historically been applied to malware detection on software binaries, to detect
potentially unsafe or malicious behavior in hardware. We present a software tool which analyzes
Trojan-inserted benchmarks, extracts their control and data-flow graphs (CDFGs), and uses this
to train an AIS behavior model, against which new hardware descriptions may be tested.
iv
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
One of the major challenges in hardware security is the detection of hardware Trojans. Hard-
ware Trojans are malicious modifications to an Integrated Circuit (IC) that change its original,
desired functionality and can perform a wide range of undesirable or unsafe actions, such as leaking
information to an attacker or causing system failure under specific conditions determined by the
Trojan designer. Trojans may be inserted at any phase of the IC design cycle, including in high
level circuit descriptions, or during fabrication in a foundry. Broadly, Trojans may be viewed as
intentional faults, where the faulty behavior is difficult to model, since it is the product of a human
designer rather than a naturally arising error caused by physical processes in fabrication. For Tro-
jans in logic or memory circuits, the payload, or faulty behavior, may be activated by certain input
combinations or sequences of input combinations, triggering the undesirable or faulty behavior [2].
These rare triggering events are designed to be stealthy and undetectable during simulation
and testing. Detecting these malicious events usually requires a golden reference model [3] that is
guaranteed to be Trojan-free. However, this may not be available, especially as Intellectual Property
(IP) cores in recent times are mostly licensed from typically untrusted third-party vendors. Another
disadvantage is that using a golden reference as the basis for detection may be inconclusive or too
complex for exhaustive verification, especially for large designs [3]. Many techniques also require
direct measurement of parameters such as power consumption or electromagnetic (EM) emissions,
and can only be faithfully applied to fabricated ICs, but not at higher levels of abstraction.
More recently, researchers have proposed detection methodologies that do not require a golden
reference model. Narasimhan et al. used a combination of functional testing and side-channel
analysis to measure the transient current signature for multiple time frames under invariable state
transitions [4]. This technique is effective when the knowledge of the activation time of the Trojan
is known. The work by Chakraborty et al. is based on statistical vector generation wherein
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rare circuit nodes are triggered numerous times by the test vectors, uncovering Trojans hidden in
these rare nodes [5]. This can provide valuable insight as to where in the circuit a Trojan may
be hidden, and it can be a beneficial tool for finding Trojans at lower levels of abstraction. For
designs still at high levels of abstraction, however, alternative techniques are required to determine
whether or not unsafe behavior exists. Zhang and Tehranipoor proposed combining multiple stages
of verification, including code-coverage analysis, assertion checking, equivalence analysis, removal
of redundant circuits, and sequential Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) to recognize
suspicious signals [6]. Fern et al. utilize Mutation Testing to detect Trojans inserted in unspecified
functionality, i.e. ”don’t care” clauses, which may escape detection through traditional verification
techniques relying on a formal specification [7].
Instead of looking for Trojans only in rare nodes, or in unspecified functionality, the goal of this
work is to develop a system which is capable of recognizing certain behavioral traits in a circuit
and classifying these traits either as benign or as containing potentially unsafe operations. A
design that contains potentially unsafe operations may be compromised, either intentionally with
malicious modifications or Trojan insertions or unintentionally through human error. Regardless,
the ability to accurately classify such behavior for any given design would enable IP designers to
quickly verify the security of their own work, or system integrators to check third party IP (3PiP)
cores used in larger designs. While other previously discussed techniques would still be applicable
at lower levels of abstraction, the ability to quickly analyze a design for unsafe behavior in RTL
could save significant time and cost if a Trojan were discovered earlier in the design flow.
This work leverages Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) [8, 9], extending the concept of distin-
guishing between self and non-self behavior for the purpose of circuit behavior classification. AIS
has been widely and successfully used in malware detection in software [10, 11, 12, 13], where
sequences of instructions may be considered ”unsafe” and may be indicative of malware, as well
as pattern recognition and optimization [14, 15]. Both the Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA)
[8] and Clonal Selection Algorithm (CSA) [16] are used to identify behavioral patterns in control
and data-flow graphs (CDFG) extracted from behavioral Verilog HDL circuit descriptions. The
models are trained on RTL Trojan benchmarks obtained from TrustHub [17, 18]. The CDFGs are
extracted using PyVerilog [19], an open-source Verilog code parser and static analyzer tool, though
any CDFG extraction tool may be used.
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Through these experiments, it is demonstrated that AIS can successfully discriminate between
designs containing safe and unsafe behavior, by recognizing patterns in Trojan-inserted designs and
matching against the design under test. The main contributions of my thesis are as follows:
1. It frames the problem of detecting unsafe behavior in RTL in terms of detecting self- vs
non-self-behavior in the design’s control and data flow.
2. It presents a complete software tool flow for AIS-based RTL source code analysis, including
model generation and behavior classification.
3. It analyzes the efficacy of Negative Selection using partial or whole string matching and
Clonal Selection algorithms on binary-encoded CDFGs for detecting unsafe behavior in RTL.
4. It demonstrates how machine learning can be used to detect unsafe behavior in Trojan-
included hardware, even if the specific instance of the Trojan has not been previously en-
countered – similar to an immune system that responds to a foreign cell in the body, even if
it has not encountered that specific virus or bacteria before.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of AIS to hardware Trojan detection at
a high level of abstraction.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the background on recent hard-
ware Trojan detection techniques that use machine learning concepts (Section 2.2) and introduce
a formal definition of a hardware Trojan, an Artificial Immune System (AIS) and its algorithms
(Section 2.3). Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the proposed Trojan detection methodology, experimental
results and analysis. Finally, chapter 5 discusses the conclusion and future work.
This thesis extends the work that has previously appeared in IEEE 2018 Asian Hardware
Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST)1 [1].
1© 2018 IEEE. Reprinted with permission from Farhath Zareen, Robert Karam, Detecting RTL Trojans using
Artificial Immune Systems and High Level Behavior Classification, 2018 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust
Symposium (AsianHOST).
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
In this section, we first define the problem of hardware Trojans and conventional detection
techniques. Second, we summarize existing ML-based Trojan detection techniques, though these
are primarily anomaly detectors on side channel data. Finally, we define Artificial Immune Systems
(AIS) and describe the AIS algorithms used in this work for circuit behavior classification 1.
2.1 Hardware Trojans
One of the major security problems for integrated circuits that has emerged in recent times,
hardware Trojans are intentional malicious modifications made to an IC to leak sensitive informa-
tion or provide back-doors for malicious activity. These modifications can be made at the design
or fabrication phases by untrusted sources (eg. foundry or design house) [3].
Specific mechanisms called trigger and payload that vary in size, ranging from a small num-
ber for transistors to multi-million transistor designs are employed to activate hardware Trojans.
The trigger periodically monitors specific signals in the circuit. In the event of a specific signal
change, the payload is activated to allow the malicious change to occur in the circuit. The trigger
conditions can sometimes be so rare that they may occur only once is many years, making the
Trojan undetectable unless that event occurs again. Two types of Trojan triggers mainly occur –
analog or digital. Analog triggers depend on natural occurrences such as temperature, EM emis-
sions etc for activation. Whereas digital triggers consist of combinational and sequential circuits.
Combinational Trojans depend on particular rare nodes wherein a rare condition occurs. They are
stateless. Sequential Trojans however are typically more difficult to detect as activation conditions
1Parts of this chapter was published in © 2018 IEEE 2018 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Sympo-
sium (AsianHOST). Permission is included in Appendix A.
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are set to be arbitrary, rendering these types of Trojans difficult to detect with standard verification
techniques.
Developing effective defenses against hardware Trojans requires a comprehensive framework
that provides a systematic study of their behavior. The first detailed taxonomy for hardware
Trojans was developed by Wang, Tehranipoor, and Plusquellic [20]. The Trojan taxonomy was
divided into three main categories depending on fundamental Trojan characteristics – physical,
activation and action. Different hardware manifestations of the Trojan is described by the physical
category. Activation refers to the triggering mechanisms that cause the Trojan to activate and
perform malicious functions. Action category describes the malicious behavior, the Trojan has
introduced in the circuit. With the sophistication of the hardware Trojan over recent years, nine
new attributes were introduced to make the taxonomy more comprehensive. The most detailed
taxonomy consists of five categories with each category consisting of different attributes. The main
categories include insertion phase, abstraction level, activation mechanism, effects and location.
[21] [22] [23].
2.1.1 Conventional Trojan Detection Approaches
Detecting hardware Trojans can be done by several methods: 1) logic testing, 2) side channel
analysis, 3) reverse engineering via physical inspection, and 4) using built-in tests such as design
for test (DFT) or design for security (DFS) techniques. However, the two main detection methods
are logic testing and side channel analysis, as the other methods are not adequate enough to detect
the most evasive of Trojans [3]
Logic testing aims to uncover Trojans through a compact testing procedure that aims to trigger
as many low-probability conditions as possible within an IC; this methodology, called multiple
excitation of rare occurrences (MERO) [5], requires that one finds the optimal set of vectors that
causes the nodes with low-probability conditions to be activated. While performing this, it is
important to note that certain nodes can be built to resist random-pattern testing, so it would be
better to toggle several of them at once to uncover their true behavior. However, since this approach
tests behaviour at a minute level, it is not good for detecting large Trojans because logic testing
is unlikely to trigger the large number of inputs needed for said Trojans to occur. In addition,
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another shortcoming to this technique lies in the generation of test vectors that are suitable for
Trojan detection.
On the other hand, side channel analysis is better suited for larger Trojans. This technique
uses physical parameters or signals (such as current, delay, or thermal) whether a Trojan is present
within the circuit; for instance, delays in a circuit can suggest that there were some new elements
added to the circuit that should not be there. Typical approaches include transient current analysis,
static current analysis, and path delay analysis, which can all be tested individually or collectively.
2.2 ML-based Hardware Trojan Detection Approaches
Several machine learning-based techniques have previously been proposed for Trojan detec-
tion, though these primarily seek to identify anomalies and classify circuits based on side channel
measurements. Some of these techniques however require a golden reference model for detection to
work. One such technique proposed by Iwase et al. [24] is a machine learning classification technique
which is trained on differing power consumption to identify Trojan-free or Trojan-inserted designs
in AES circuit. They used Discrete Fourier Transforms to convert acquired power consumption
waveform data from the time domain to frequency domain as features to train the SVM. Another
ML classification technique proposed by Lodhi et al. [25] uses a combination of timing signatures
and classification algorithms for detecting HTs. They implemented a self-learning framework which
uses their proposed macro synchronous micro asynchronous (MSMA) signature technique for fea-
ture extraction. A golden reference model is again used to extract features from MSMA which are
then used to train KNN, decision trees, and Bayesian Classifiers. A ML technique that does not
classify circuits based on side channel measurements but requires a golden model is proposed in
[26], the IC’s physical layout is extracted using reverse engineering and imaging techniques. Re-
sulting scans of the IC layers are analyzed, and an SVM is trained to characterize Trojan-inserted
and Trojan-free structures in the IC using features obtained from the imaging procedure. This
RE technique does not require the need for generating a transistor or gate netlist, but requires
high resolution, low noise scans for accurate classification. This may become more challenging with
future process technologies and smaller feature sizes.
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Other ML techniques that do no require a golden reference model and are not based on side
channel measurement are proposed by Hasegawa et al. [27] and Ova et al. [28]. These include
an SVM classifier trained to detect Trojans in a gate level netlist, using features such as flip-flop
input/output and primary input/output for training, finding that dynamic weighting for SVM
training gives an accuracy of 80% [27]. Alternatively, Oya et al. used a score-based classification
technique for discerning between Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted netlists. Instead of identifying a
netlist as an HT-inserted circuit, they focus on finding Trojan nets within these designs to classify
it as a HT-inserted design. This approach enabled successful Trojan detection in certain TrustHub
benchmarks. FANCI [29] and VeriTrust [30] are two other state-of-the-art techniques that use non-
ML-based design stage verification on gate-level netlists. FANCI utilizes ”control values” which
depicts how the functionality of certain wires in the IC affects other wires to identify malicious
wires that carry potential backdoor trigger signals. VeriTrust uses ”tracers” and ”checkers” to look
for redundant inputs (suspicious Trojan signals) and determine if signals are carried by redundant
inputs.
We use Artificial Immune Systems (AIS), an alternative class of ML techniques which have
been widely used for malware detection in software. We do not consider side channel data or logic
functions, and do not require simulation or silicon measurements of any kind. Instead, we aim
to classify high level behavioral traits in a circuit, based on its control flow and data flow graph
(CDFG), to detect the presence of unsafe and unwanted operations. Implementation specifics are
abstracted out at the CDFG level, and the CDFG encapsulates both sequential (control flow) and
combinational (data flow) behavior, enabling detection of RTL Trojans.
We do not consider side channel data or logic functions, and do not require simulation or silicon
measurements of any kind. Instead, we aim to classify high level behavioral traits in a circuit, based
on its control and data flow graph (CDFG), in order to detect the presence of such behaviors deemed
to be unsafe or result in unwanted operations. Because implementation specifics are abstracted at
the CDFG level, and the CDFG encapsulates both sequential (control flow) and combinational
(data flow) behavior, it can be trained to identify a range of behaviors often associated with Trojan
or Trojan-like behavior.
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2.3 Artificial Immune Systems
The field of natural computing is primarily concerned with the theoretical analysis, under-
standing and modeling of biological phenomena or processes. As a part of this field are classes
of algorithms that mimic processes that are observed in nature. Artificial Immune Systems (AIS)
are a primary example of such algorithms; these systems are a computationally intelligent class
of machine learning algorithms biologically inspired by the vertebrate immune system that aim to
learn how to identify negative examples from positive examples. Research on AIS has resulted in
many noteworthy algorithms and their applications extend to several real world problems and areas,
including anomaly detection, pattern recognition, and optimization. In biological immune systems,
the role of the immune system is that of a protector, wherein it fights and removes destructive
micro-organisms such as bacteria or viruses and returns the body to a healthy state.
2.3.1 Overview of AIS
AIS is based on the theory that immune systems distinguish the pathogen (any malicious entity)
as non-self and the body’s cells (benign entities) as self. Detection of pathogens is described in terms
of distinguishing ”self” from ”non-self” where ”self” is synonymous with the normal functioning
of the body and ”non-self” as an anomaly or abnormality that is foreign to the body. However,
not all pathogens need to be eliminated as most are not harmful to the body. Therefore, immune
systems characterize ”self” as anything that is harmless to the body and ”non-self” as any pathogen
that causes harm to the normal functioning of the body. The non-self cells are also equipped with
appropriate defense mechanisms. The function of the immune system is to learn how to distinguish
”self” from ”non-self” through the process of self-replication and evolution. Hence, detection and
elimination of harmful pathogens is a result of millions of types of immune cells circulating the
body and interacting with other cells. The main immune cell taking part in the immune response
is the lymphocyte whereas other types of cells called the phagocytic cells are secondary immune
cells that help lymphocytes to eliminate pathogens. The two main types of lymphocytes are B cells
and T cells which develop and mature in the lymphoid organs. Specifically, B cells develop and
mature in the bone marrow whereas T cells develop in the bone marrow, but travel to the thymus
to mature. The secondary lymphoid organs act as locations where antigen interactions occur to
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stimulate an immune response. Lymphocytes contain thousands of receptors on their surface that
bind to pathogens based on their chemical structure. The likelihood of chemical bonding increases
with their affinity. Immune cells that recognize a pathogen stimulate multiplication and separation
of cells to produce clones (antibodies). Therefore, a large population of antibody-producing cells
are generated that are specific to the exposed antigen. This reproduction process is called clonal
expansion. Memory cells are also generated to stimulate immediate immune response when a similar
antigens are exposed in the future. [31] [32]
These immune system inspired concepts of antibodies (self and benign entity) and antigens
(malicious and non-self entity) are applied to the computational understanding of malicious and
normal behavior of the system for accurate anomaly detection. Three fundamental immunological
theories are the basis of AIS – clonal selection, negative selection, and immune networks. Research
has been done on learning and memory mechanisms of the immune system and anomalous entity
detection. By utilizing adaptive and innate immune responses, the immune system can fight the
attacker. The immunological theories are based on adaptive and innate immune responses. The
two basic types of immunity, adaptive and innate fight invading agents (i.e. pathogens). The
innate immune response helps in initiation of immune responses and fight all kinds of pathogens
in general whereas the adaptive immune response which primarily consists of lymphocytes fights
specific pathogens. In this thesis, the research focus has been on anomalous entity detection using
both Negative and Clonal Selection Algorithms.
2.3.2 Negative Selection Algorithm
Special white blood cells called T-cells, which are produced in the bone marrow, are primarily
responsible for immunity in the body through the elimination of pathogens that are harmful to the
body. During their development cycle, they usually undergo a maturation process in the thymus
gland referred to as T-cell tolerance or negative selection [33, 34]. This procedure is important, as it
removes ”faulty” or harmful cells produced through cell division. From the biological perspective,
harmful cells are determined by those T-cells that strongly bind with self-proteins. These T-cells
are eliminated if this binding process activates the cells since they would harm self-cells that are
native to the body. The recognition of self and non-self comes into play wherein cells that are
self-reactive at the time of propagation are removed. Along the same lines, the Negative Selection
9
Figure 2.1: Overview of the Negative Selection Algorithm as Discussed in Section 2.3.2 [1]
Algorithm is mainly used to detect manipulation of data by viruses. The system is deployed with
detectors that are trained to discriminate between manipulated data and the original data.
The Negative Selection Algorithm (illustrated in Figure 2.1) consists of two phases: the detector
generation phase, and the detector application phase. These two phases can also be referred to as
the censoring and monitoring phases, respectively [8]. They are both akin to the training and
testing phases of machine learning, respectively. The censoring phase results in the generation of
mature detectors that can be used for detecting non-self behavior. Subsequently, the system being
protected is monitored for changes by the detectors generated in the censoring stage.
The algorithm (given as Algorithm 1) first defines a set of examples that describe typical IC
behavior, denoted by Sself , which the AIS needs to know how to distinguish normal self-cells
from non-self. The data that is to be protected (contained within Sself ) is viewed in terms of
a binary-encoded string. The string is then split into several l-length substrings to make up the
set of Sself data. Once Sself is populated, we then generate a set of candidate detectors R of
a specified length l from the binary-encoded string of CDFGs obtained from the selected Trojan
benchmarks. We directly obtain candidate detectors from the Trojan benchmarks to generate a set
of competent detectors in the censoring phase. Traditionally, random string generation is used to
build the candidate detector set. However, using real examples to build the detector set reduces
the likelihood of false negatives.
The candidate detectors in R are then matched to the entire self-set Sself . Strings from R
that match any of those in Sself are eliminated from further consideration. On the other hand,
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Algorithm 1: Negative Selection Algorithm
Let R be set of strings generated from CDFG encodings;
Let Sself be subset of strings that represents self-behavior;
Let N be the desired number of detectors;
Create detector set Snon−self made of non-self strings;
do
forall strings r ∈ R do
if r /∈ Sself then
Add r to Snon−self ;
end
else
Remove string r from R
end
end
while size(Snon−self ) ≤ N ;
forall strings r ∈ testcase do
if r /∈ Snon−self then
Label case as anomaly;
end
end
the strings that do not match any of the strings in Sself become members of the final detector set
collection Snon−self . This is repeated until all candidate substrings in R have been compared to
those in Sself ; at this point, we will have a representative detector set that is able to distinguish
familiar cases with those that do not match typical behavior. During testing, changes to self are
monitored by continually choosing each detector in R and testing to see if there is any match with
strings in Snon−self . If the self-string matches one of the detector strings in Snon−self , this indicates
that there is a Trojan within the IC.
2.3.3 Clonal Selection Algorithm
As a defense mechanism in vertebrate immune systems, when the body is under attack by
antigens, the body massively produces cells that are capable of countering these antigens [35]. The
clonal selection principle in immunology describes how the B and T cells of the lymphocytes are
reproduced in adaptive immune response through the process of affinity maturation [36] – where
cells are repeatedly exposed to antigens to develop stronger antibodies that are resistant to threats.
Through affinity maturation, these antibodies would then be capable of binding to antigens, and
these cells are kept and multiplied into clones to fight against the infection. Some of these cells
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the Clonal Selection Algorithm as Discussed in Section 2.3.3 [1]
are also retained as memory cells that circulate over a period of time to fight remaining antigens
that they recognize in the body. The computational Clonal Selection Algorithm (also known as
CLONALG [16]) is based on this clonal selection theory, emphasizing on learning key attributes
and maintaining memory of positive examples. This algorithm is inspired by Darwinian attributes,
where only the fittest cells survive and are kept as antibodies to defend against antigen threats and
that newer generations tend to vary through mutation.
The Clonal Selection Algorithm (illustrated in Figure 2.2) has mainly been used for pattern
recognition and optimization tasks [14]. It learns about threats through the production of antibody
memory cells that mutate when they encounter antigens and consequently acquire the character-
istics of these antigens over time. Algorithmically, the process of affinity maturation [37] is used
to randomly generate a set of antibodies that are similar to antigen (or foreign) examples based
on the affinity or similarity between the antibody and the antigen. The maturation rate describes
the amount of mutation that happens to a particular antibody, and this is directly proportional to
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the affinity of the cell to the encountered antigen. Antibodies with a high affinity are cloned and
mutated with minimal changes as a result of affinity maturation; antibodies with a lower affinity
are typically mutated to a higher degree. The cells then mutate to form clones and acquire the
characteristics of the antigen. Long-term exposure of these memory cells leads to the final pool of
memory cells that consist of all the antigen characteristics they were exposed to, resulting in an
optimized pool of memory cells.
The algorithm (given as Algorithm 2) initially generates a random set of antibodies (i.e. benign
examples) to produce a set of detectors. These antibodies are then exposed to antigens (i.e. mali-
cious examples) to then determine whether they are suitable for detection or not, which is indicated
by a high degree of affinity or similarity to the antigens. With exposure to antigens, the cloned
detector set acquires the features of the subjected antigens, and over a period of time, it is able to
generate a single optimized clone that reflects all the characteristics of the antigens to which it has
been exposed. Higher affinity clones are added to a memory set, which is then used for classifying
unseen cases as Trojan-inserted designs, after being exposed to training antigen examples.
The algorithm initially generates a random set of antibodies (self examples) SAb of a prede-
termined fixed size Npop, and it generates a set of antigens (non-self examples) SAg, which are
taken directly from Trojan-inserted designs. The algorithm also allocates a subset of generated
clones Sclones and a memory subset M of clones selected for detection. The process of generation
takes place, where each antibody in SAb is iteratively exposed to a pool of antigens SAg. For each
antibody exposed to a randomly selected antigen RanAg from SAg, its affinity value to the antigen
is calculated using the Hamming distance; this process is referred to as affinity maturation [37].
Hamming distance is defined as the least number of substitutions needed to modify one string into
the other, or the least number of errors that can transform one string into the other [38]. The anti-
bodies with the highest affinity to the subjected antigens are cloned and added to Sclones. The rate
of cloning (rateC) on a single antibody in SAg is directly proportional to its affinity; basically, the
higher the affinity, the more clones are produced. At the same time, clones are randomly mutated
or altered to potentially increase their affinity. The rate of mutation (rateM ) however is inversely
proportional to the affinity of a given antibody; in other words, the lower an antibody’s affinity is,
the more mutation occurs on the antibody on each generated clone. The process of affinity matura-
tion is then repeated on the cloned antibodies to measure their new affinity values. The clones with
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Algorithm 2: Clonal Selection Algorithm
Let G be number of generations (iterations);
Let M be memory set of detector clones;
Let SAb be set of antibodies;
Let Sclones be set of antibody clones;
Let SAg be set of antigens;
Let Npop be the desired number of antibodies generated for each generation;
Let rateC be cloning rate and rateM be mutation rate;
do
randomly pick an antigen RanAg from SAg;
randomly generate antibodies for SAb of size Npop;
forall antibody Ab in SAb do
calculate affinity to RanAg;
if affinity of Ab is above threshold then
Create clones of Ab using rateC ;
Mutate clones of Ab using rateM ;
Add clones to Sclones;
end
end
forall clone C in Sclones do
calculate affinity to RanAg;
if affinity of C is above threshold then
Add clone C to M ;
end
end
while for all generations G;
Use memory set M for classifying malicious examples;
the highest degree of affinity after this affinity maturation process are then saved in the detector
memory subset M and the clones with the lowest degree of affinity maturation are replaced with
other samples from RAb. After a certain number of generations G (or simply, iterations of affinity
maturation), the memory set M is then ready to be used in detecting abnormalities.
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CHAPTER 3
DETECTION METHODOLOGY
The Negative Selection and Clonal Selection Algorithms are used in the detection of hardware
Trojans inserted in a high level circuit model, specifically behavioral Verilog HDL. Briefly, a static
analysis tool is used to generate a control and data-flow graph from which features are extracted
and used for training the AIS. For training and testing purposes, we use a set of RTL benchmarks
from TrustHub [17, 18] labeled as either Trojan-inserted (non-self) or Trojan-free (self) 1.
3.1 CDFG Generation and Feature Extraction
The control and data-flow graphs of a program represent the internal sequence of operations or
procedures that are performed to execute the program from beginning to end. A control-flow graph
[39] provides a representation of all the paths that can be traversed through a program during
its execution; in this graph, nodes represent basic blocks that express a sequence of consecutive
statements, and edges represent any possible flow of control from one node to another. A data-flow
graph [40] represents the data dependencies between different operations that a program performs
and can be viewed as a fundamental expression of a computational structure. Thus, a CDFG fully
encapsulates the behavior of the design, including any potentially unsafe or undesired behavior,
regardless of how such behavior was incorporated into the design. The underlying assumption,
then, is that the CDFG is wholly and correctly extracted from the source. By training an AIS to
recognize patterns in the CDFG as potentially unsafe, whether the intent is malicious or not, it can
detect non-self behavior in RTL designs. Furthermore, through the use of AIS and the evolutionary
nature of the learning process, we propose that by training on example Trojan-included CDFGs,
similar (if not exact) behavior in other designs may also be identified; thus, the training itself need
1This chapter was published in © 2018 IEEE 2018 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
(AsianHOST). Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Figure 3.1: RTL Trojan Detection in CDFGs with Artificial Immune Systems [1]
not be comprehensive to have a high degree of accuracy on Trojans that have never been previously
encountered Trojans.
The Python tool PyVerilog [19] is used to generate CDFGs for each benchmark. It initially
constructs an abstract syntax tree representation from behavioral Verilog code. Within the design
hierarchy, a tree traversal method is implemented to define signal scope and determine all param-
eters and constants. It then builds an assignment tree for every signal in the code to provide a
complete representation of the control and data flow. As PyVerilog generates CDFGs for single-
procedure Verilog files, each design must first be flattened to a single procedure. Control-flow and
data-flow analysis is performed on these flattened benchmarks to generate CDFGs. Information
regarding nodes and edges, isolated nodes, conditional and directed edges etc. are extracted as
features by converting categorical data derived from CDF analysis to an adjacency matrix repre-
sentation, which is binary encoded as strings for input to the AIS training procedure. The entire
pipeline, from CDFG generation to feature extraction, is shown as Figure 3.1.
The format of the binary-encoded string is summarized in Figure 3.2. Specifically, we encode
the graph as follows: first, We denote the structure type (input, output, reg, or wire) as a 2-bit type
string. This highlights certain node types for the learning procedure. We then use the adjacency
matrix to append an m-bit edge connectivity string derived from a single row of the matrix, where
”0” indicates an edge does not exist between two nodes, and ”1” indicates an edge does exist. The
length of this string is equal to the number of nodes in the graph, m. Nodes with no outgoing edges
(isolated nodes) have an edge connectivity string of all 0’s. Appended to this is another string which
indicates conditions that trigger a change in control flow. This is referred to as a condition-based
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Figure 3.2: Binary Encoding of CDFG Nodes Used for AIS Training [1]
edge connectivity string (as shown in 3.2). We can account for conditions such as ’greater-than’,
’less-than’ or ’not equal to’, etc. Finally, we can generalize the condition-based edge connectivity
string by compressing it into a count of the number of edges for each type of condition. This is
referred to as the condition frequency string.
Node and edge information are essential features in CDFGs, as their connectivity depicts differ-
ences in benign and malicious behavior. For example, as Trojan-inserted code essentially contains
hidden characteristics, connectivity is generally indistinct whereas benign code is unambiguous
and exhibits dynamic connectivity. In addition, there may be certain combinations or sequences
of instructions which suggest unspecified functionality. This is where the frequency of conditions
together with the flow of instructions of one type to another can be used by the AIS to learn normal
and abnormal behavior.
3.2 Benchmarks
The training and testing data used in the experiments were taken from TrustHub [17, 18]. An
overview of the benchmarks found in this repository and used in this work can be found in Table
3.1, and detailed descriptions of each benchmark is shown in Table 3.2. This repository consists of
a variety of designs classified under different attributes such as levels of abstraction, the phase at
which hardware Trojans were inserted, the intended location of the circuits (e.g. if the design is
meant for input/output, power, etc.), and the harmful effects of those Trojans (e.g. denial-of-service
or leaking of information). The Trojan behavior ranges from making malicious functional changes
to leak data or manipulate instruction registers, to activating denial-of-service or degrading overall
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Table 3.1: List of Hardware Trojan Benchmarks [1]
Benchmark # Trojan-Free # Trojan-Inserted
AES 21 21
MC8051 7 7
PIC16F84 4 4
RS232 10 10
wb conmax 2 2
Other 6 0
Table 3.2: Attributes of the Hardware Trojan Benchmarks from TrustHub
Trojan Characteristics
Benchmarks
AES MC8051 PIC16f84 RS232 wb conmax
Effect
Leak Information X X
Denial of Service X X X X
Change Functionality X X
Location
Processor X X X
I/O X X
Power Supply X X
Activation
Always On X
Trigger Condition X X X X X
performance. For our experiments, we use a total of 50 Trojan-free and 44 Trojan-inserted RTL
benchmarks.
3.3 Training and Testing the AIS
In this section, we discuss the AIS training and testing process. The training is done as a leave-
one-out cross validation, where we train on all examples but one type of circuit in our benchmarks
and test it on the remaining benchmark. This is done for all benchmark circuit types so that we
have n AIS detectors for n circuit types. For example, we train one AIS on all circuit types except
for AES, and the AES circuit examples would then be used in the testing phase, and for a second
AIS, we train on all circuit types except MC8051 and the MC8051 circuit examples would then be
used in the testing phase, and so on. We therefore train and test on all the benchmarks on batches
of examples in a round-robin fashion until there is no significant change in accuracy or loss. The
leave-one-out cross validation technique, therefore, enables testing on unseen benchmarks and as a
consequence, the AIS learns a generalization of what makes a circuit a Trojan-inserted design so it
can detect unseen cases.
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3.3.1 Negative Selection Algorithm
The binary-encoded CDFG features are used as input to the AIS. During the censoring phase
(i.e. the training phase), the AIS is trained on Trojan-inserted and Trojan-free examples to develop
a mature detector set that contains binary strings which were detected as non-self. This process is
done as follows: first, the program initially reads the benchmark CDFG binaries to create 32-bit
binary strings which are then used to build the self set (i.e. benign features) from Trojan-free and
and the detector set from Trojan-inserted examples. The binary string length is arbitrarily chosen
based on the length of the generated CDFG binaries. Larger string lengths reduce feature loss.
The self set is then compared against 32-bit strings of the Trojan-inserted binary encodings to
build the detector set. The detector set contains strings from those examples which do not match
Trojan-free binary-encoded features. This process is repeated until all training examples from the
Trojan-inserted benchmarks have been given to the AIS.
After the censoring phase, the detector set is then applied to unseen (i.e. not used for training)
binary-encoded CDFG benchmarks to determine whether they are Trojan-inserted or Trojan-free.
In the censoring phase, either whole or partial string matching may be used to distinguish self from
non-self strings. Using partial string matching shortens the time taken in string comparisons. In our
experiments, we tested both to determine whether there is a significant difference in performance.
3.3.2 Clonal Selection Algorithm
As per the Clonal Selection Algorithm process in Section 2.3.3, we begin by defining the size
of our population of antibodies and the size of our memory set. For our AIS, the generation phase
uses a population size of 100, i.e. the randomly generated antibodies, and a memory set containing
50 detector clones. Each antibody (self example) and antigen (non-self example) is represented by
32-bit length strings. The antibody population set is subjected to an affinity maturation process
with the antigen set consisting of 22 Trojan-inserted examples. As we discussed before, the memory
set is used for classifying unseen cases, as it will contain antibodies which have a high affinity to
the antigen (Trojan-inserted) examples.
The cloning rate determines how quickly the highest affinity antibodies are multiplied and
reproduced, while the mutation rate is inversely proportional to the affinity of the antibody we are
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cloning. The higher the affinity, the lesser the effect of the mutation on the clones, such that the
quality of the antibody is preserved. This generation process is continued for 50 iterations. At
the end of every generation, we always try to keep the highest affinity out of all antibodies seen
in memory and at the end of the generation phase. This ensures that we have the best antibodies
for classification of new cases. For testing, we match the antigens (Trojan-inserted examples) to
the memory set of high affinity antibodies for detection. If a string has a high affinity (i.e. high
overlap), then it is classified as containing the target unsafe behavior.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For accurate anomaly detection, we must correctly classify both unsafe and safe behaviors.
Errors in the first category, where unsafe behavior is not identified, are false negatives; errors in
the second category, where safe behavior is identified as unsafe, are false positives. We use the
terms correctly classified and incorrectly classified to describe true positive/true negative and false
positive/false negative rates respectively. An ideal system would therefore maximize the detection
accuracy for unsafe behavior (true positives), while minimizing false negatives and false positives.
All of the experiments were run on 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 with an Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB
of RAM 1.
4.1 AIS Detection Accuracy
Both AIS algorithms demonstrated high accuracy in distinguishing between self and non-self
behavior in the test dataset (Tables 4.1 and 4.2). With NSA partial string matching, a 10-bit fixed
length substring from the 32-bit length string is selected and a sliding window is applied which,
for every iteration, moves in position for the censoring and monitoring phases. As observed in
Table 4.1, Trojan detection using the partial string matching technique has a detection accuracy
range of 70% to 100%. For whole string matching, we use the generated 32-bit strings for training
and testing. We observed a detection accuracy ranging from 80% to 100% in Table 4.1. For both
techniques, we observe an average false negative rate of 12.6% and false positive rate of 14.8%.
Table 4.2 shows the detection accuracy of the implemented CSA with an observed average false
negative rate of 12.8% and false positive rate of 14.7%. Results are shown in the form of a confusion
matrix in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 where TT ′ and FF ′ represent the true positives and true negatives
1This chapter was published in © 2018 IEEE 2018 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium
(AsianHOST). Permission is included in Appendix A
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Table 4.1: Results of Negative Selection Algorithm [1]
Benchmarks Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified
Partial String Matching
AES 90.5% 9.5%
MC8051 71.4% 28.6%
PIC16f84 75% 25%
RS232 70% 30%
wb conmax 100% 0%
Whole String Matching
AES 90.5% 9.5%
MC8051 85.7% 14.3%
PIC16f84 100% 0%
RS232 80% 20%
wb conmax 100% 0%
(correctly classified as either benign or malicious), whereas FT ′ and TF ′ represent false positives
and false negatives (incorrectly classified as either benign or malicious) respectively.
Table 4.2: Results of Clonal Selection Algorithm [1]
Benchmarks Correctly Classified Incorrectly Classified
AES 90.5% 9.5%
MC8051 85.7% 14.3%
PIC16f84 75% 25%
RS232 80% 20%
wb conmax 100% 0%
As observed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, AIS implements the Negative Selection and Clonal Selection
Algorithms to efficiently detect the unsafe behavior for which the system was trained – in this case,
malicious modifications – in the benchmark circuits test dataset. As with any machine learning-
based technique, the accuracy can be improved by providing additional examples of malicious
behavior from which the AIS model can learn, as well as AIS parameter tuning. Other features can
be considered from the designs that can allow us to potentially yield better results. However, in
this case, no attempt was made to train the AIS models beyond a general classification of ”unsafe
behavior” – properties such the specific structure, size, and integration of the Trojan in the RTL
was not considered. In order to identify the type of threat that lies within a design, we would
require these details as extra features to feed to the AIS during training. Nevertheless, we believe
the results are promising for detecting generally unsafe behavior in CDFGs.
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Table 4.3: Confusion Matrix for Negative Selection Algorithm [1]
Partial String Matching
Benchmarks T′ F′
AES
T 19 2
F 2 19
MC8051
T 5 2
F 2 5
PIC16f84
T 4 0
F 2 2
RS232
T 8 2
F 4 6
wb conmax
T 2 0
F 0 2
Whole String Matching
Benchmarks T′ F′
AES
T 19 2
F 2 19
MC8051
T 5 2
F 0 7
PIC16f84
T 4 0
F 0 4
RS232
T 7 3
F 1 9
wb conmax
T 2 0
F 0 2
Table 4.4: Confusion Matrix for Clonal Selection Algorithm [1]
Benchmarks T′ F′
AES
T 20 1
F 3 18
MC8051
T 6 1
F 1 6
PIC16f84
T 3 1
F 1 3
RS232
T 8 2
F 2 8
wb conmax
T 2 0
F 0 2
Table 4.5: Overview of CDFG Generation and AIS Analysis Times
Benchmarks
CDFG
Generation
Time (hrs)
File Size
(kb)
(≈)
Analysis Time(secs) (≈)
Negative Selection Clonal
SelectionPartial
String
Matching
Whole String
Matching
AES 30 183.4-269.1 126 118 128
MC8051 28 108.2-126.2 122 110 124
PIC16f84 19 106.0-114.6 125 116 126
RS232 26 166.6-193.8 126 120 127
wb conmax 15 106.3-115.7 118 110 120
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The proposed AIS can be used for narrowing down the quantity of designs that need to be
further inspected for different classes of Trojans using another detector, which can take the form
of another classifier not limited to AIS. Results can only be considered specific to the Trojan
benchmarks used and require more amounts of training for the system to be effective in classifying
malicious behavior from normal system behavior. In addition to insufficient training data, CDFG
generation also proved to be a bottleneck. Firstly, CDFG generation with PyVerilog required
designs to be flattened to single procedures, which was not the case for the benchmarks selected
from TrustHub (and which are likely the case for other real designs). Furthermore, as observed in
Table 4.5, for more complex benchmarks, the actual process of CDFG generation took significant
time, upwards of several days for the most complex benchmarks (the file size in Table 4.5 refers to
time taken to generate CDFGs for one file each of the respective benchmarks ). Improvements in
CDFG generation time for high level synthesis tools can reduce this time and make the flow more
tenable.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this thesis, a novel technique is proposed for the detection of hardware Trojans in RTL based
on high level circuit behavior. I have employed the concept of an Artificial Immune System, a
machine learning technique based on biological immune systems which aims to discriminate between
self-behavior and non-self behavior. Binary-encoded CDFGs were extracted from TrustHub RTL
Trojan benchmarks for training and testing the AIS. Results indicate that Negative and Clonal
Selection, with their evolutionary-like learning processes, are capable of detecting certain behaviors
in CDFGs on which the models were trained, indicating the presence of a Trojan in the hardware
description.
Future work will consider ways to further improve accuracy by tuning some of the detector
parameters. For example, in CSA, the population size, the memory size, cloning rate, and mutation
rate can all be adjusted, and in NSA, we can tune the size of the substring for partial string matching
and compare varying positions of these substrings. False negatives can be further reduced by
selecting features most appropriate in classifying self and non-self behavior, training and testing on
larger datasets, improving the encoding process etc. Determining the optimal or ideal variables for
both NSA and CSA may provide additional insight. Understanding what specific features of the
CDFG are best for classification and why these certain features work the best will provide valuable
insight into detecting Trojan-like behavior in CDFGs. Furthermore, exploring the features that can
be obtained from these designs that can lead to determining the type of hardware Trojan detected
in the design and, more importantly, the location of the hardware Trojan in the design. Reverse
engineering the detection process to identifying where the unsafe behavior was detected in the
original source would provide hardware designers and system integrators with a valuable tool for
improving security of hardware systems during the design stage.
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